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Responding to Socially Desirable and 
Undesirable Topics: Different Types of 
Response Behaviour?
Henrik Andersen & Jochen Mayerl
Chemnitz University of Technology
Abstract
Social desirability describes the tendency of respondents to present themselves in a more 
positive light than is accurate and is a serious concern in surveys. If researchers are better 
able to understand the underlying mechanisms responsible for social desirability bias, they 
may be able to devise ways to identify and correct for it. One possibility involves determin-
ing whether social desirability is more of a deliberate ‘editing’ of responses or an auto-
matic, perhaps ‘self-deceptive’, act. Then researchers could potentially flag conspicuously 
fast or slow responses to improve data quality. We outline dual-process-related theoretical 
arguments for both scenarios and test their plausibility using data gathered in a tablet-based 
CASI survey of pre-service teachers in Germany that were asked to assess their suitability 
for their chosen profession. Our analysis involves the use of fixed-effects multilevel models 
that enable us to control for unobserved differences between respondent- and item-char-
acteristics while also examining cross-level interactions between the predictors at various 
levels. Specifically, we examine the classic respondent- (i.e. need for social approval) and 
item-related characteristics (i.e. trait desirability) associated with social desirability bias, 
as well as the speed at which the respondents gave their answers. Doing so allows us to 
observe under what circumstances the respondents tended to overstate positive character-
istics as well as understate negative ones. We find evidence for social desirability as an 
automatic as well as a deliberate response behaviour. However, the mechanism responsible 
for determining whether social desirability occurs automatically or deliberately seems to 
be whether the item content is desirable or undesirable. Desirable traits seem to elicit faster 
socially desirable responses whereas undesirable traits seem to elicit slower socially desir-
able responses. 
Keywords: social desirability, sensitive questions, response latencies, paradata, response 
bias, survey research, multilevel models 
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Social desirability (SD) bias describes respondents systematically presenting them-
selves in a more positive light than is accurate in self-reported surveys. It is a serious 
concern in survey research and can impact prevalence estimates of behaviour and 
attitudes as well as observed relationships between variables (Stocké & Hunkler 
2007). For decades, researchers have tried to better understand the underlying pro-
cesses that result in SD bias. Doing so may make it possible to identify measure-
ment error due to SD and improve data quality (Tourangeau & Yan 2007). Much 
of the research thus far has focused on the question of whether SD is a deliberate 
or an automatic action. The main goal of this article is to contribute to finding an 
answer to this question. If it is mostly deliberate and respondents carefully consider 
the desirability of their answer before giving it, then it may be possible to ‘flag’ 
answers that took the respondent particularly long to answer, for example. If SD is 
mostly automatic, the same could be true for unusually fast answers. 
The measurement of response latencies (RLs) provides a promising method of 
indirectly assessing the underlying processes associated with SD bias. In psycho-
logical research, RLs have been used for decades as a common method of measur-
ing cognitive processes (e.g. Fazio 1990b). In survey research, the development of 
computer assisted technology (e.g. CATI, CAPI, CASI) made it possible to include 
such measurements even in large-scale survey projects (e.g. Bassili & Fletcher 
1991). One of the most prominent applications involves their use as a proxy mea-
sure for cognitive processing modes (e.g. Fazio 1990a; Mayerl 2009) with faster 
responses suggesting a more automatic-spontaneous mode; slower responses a 
deliberate-controlled one. 
Regardless of the promise RL measurement shows, it has become clear that 
the solution to the problem of SD is not as simple as: “socially desirable responses 
are fast/slow”. Rather, it seems a whole range of factors influence how respondents 
deal with survey questions. These include respondent-related personality traits, 
characteristics of the question content, the respondents’ unknown ‘true’ answers 
and characteristics related to the survey situation (see Krumpal 2013; Tourangeau 
& Yan 2007 for a comprehensive overview). 
This article looks to contribute to better understanding the factors that lead 
to SD responses and ways to sensibly incorporate RLs to improve data quality. We 
investigate the question as to whether SD is more the result of automatic or delib-
erate processes and outline theoretical arguments for both scenarios. We use data 
collected in a tablet-based CASI survey of pre-service teachers in Germany that 
were asked to assess their suitability for their chosen profession. To approach the 
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research question, we examine not only the classic respondent- (i.e. need for social 
approval) and item-related characteristics (i.e. trait desirability) associated with SD 
bias, but also the speed at which the respondents gave their answers. We observe 
under what circumstances the respondents tended to overstate positive character-
istics as well as understate negative ones and tie the results back to the theoretical 
discussion. 
In the next section, we outline a theory of SD responding that incorporates 
both automatic and deliberate viewpoints and allows us to generate logical expecta-
tions for the later analysis. After giving an overview of our data and variables, we 
outline the analytical strategy which involves the specification of successive mul-
tilevel models. We then present our empirical results and finally summarize and 
discuss the implications for future research. 
Theoretical Background
In this section, we outline two typical ways to approach the topic of SD: as a delib-
erate utility maximizing- and an automatic norm-conforming behaviour. We focus 
on some influential works by researchers in the analytical-empirical tradition. 
Dual Processes and the Determinants of Social Desirability
It is now well established that SD bias encompasses at least two distinct factors 
(Holtgraves 2004; Krumpal 2013; Paulhus 1984; Paulhus & Reid 1991; Tourangeau 
& Yan 2007; Wiggens 1964). What is referred to as impression management 
describes situations in which respondents deliberately misreport either to gain 
approval or avoid disapproval. Self-deception, on the other hand, describes self-
reports that are inflated but sincere (Paulhus 1984). Two different underlying cogni-
tive processes are implied: impression management is a rational, utility-maximiz-
ing action that is motivated by the goal of gaining approval or avoiding disapproval. 
Self-deception can be seen as an automatic reaction to highly accessible and inter-
nalized social norms (Esser 1990; Kroneberg 2006). 
In order to properly examine SD bias, we thus need a theoretical framework 
that encompasses both utility-maximizing rational actions as well as automatic 
norm-guided ones. The Model of Frame Selection (MFS, Esser 1991b; Kroneberg 
2006; Mayerl 2009) offers such a framework and has previously been applied to 
explain respondent behaviour by several researchers (Esser 1990; 1991b; Mayerl 
2009, 2010; Skarbek-Kozietulska et al. 2012; Stocké 2004, 2007; Wolter 2012; 
Wolter & Junkermann 2018). The MFS extends the classical rational choice theory 
(RCT) by 1) accounting for ostensibly non-utility-maximizing behaviour based on 
actors’ subjective experiences, i.e. the framing of the situation and 2) incorporating 
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 13(1), 2019, pp. 7-3510 
what is referred to as variable rationality; the idea that actors reduce complexity 
and effort with the help of symbols, norms, habits and emotions (Kroneberg 2006). 
Both of these extensions are important for the analysis of SD bias and will be dis-
cussed in turn.
The MFS assumes actors go through several implicit steps before acting. The 
actor must first interpret the situation ( frame selection), then they must identify 
sets of appropriate behaviours for the situation (script selection), before then per-
forming the action (action selection) (Kroneberg 2006). The extent to which actors 
go through these steps in a deliberate as opposed to a spontaneous fashion refers 
to the assumption of variable rationality. Frames, scripts and actions can thus be 
selected in either a deliberate reflecting-calculating (rc) or automatic-spontaneous 
(as) manner (Esser 1991b; Kroneberg 2006). The factors that are said to determine 
the mode of selection are opportunities, motivation, effort and accessibility (this is 
compatible with social psychological dual-process theory, e.g. Fazio 1990a; see for 
an overview Mayerl 2009). Opportunities refer to things like time or capabilities; 
motivation is often provided by fear of making a wrong decision; deliberate consid-
eration requires effort (whereas automatic actions require little); accessibility refers 
to the ease of finding appropriate selections (Kroneberg 2006). 
In terms of SD, two of the most prominent applications of the MFS, an arti-
cle by Esser from 19901 and another by Stocké from 20042, present contradictory 
accounts with regards to the question of whether SD is an automatic or deliberate 
action. It is important that the reader is aware of the fact that we will first outline 
the arguments as they were originally presented, and that the discrepancies therein 
represent part of the puzzle we wish to contribute to solving. 
SD as an Automatic Response Behaviour
Esser (1990) describes social desirability as an automatic action that is the result of 
the cognitive accessibility, or match, of the frame of SD. He sees SD as a response 
set; a temporary strategy employed by respondents with a strong internalized need 
for social approval (NSA) to simplify their choice of actions. He describes that in 
a low-cost situation3 such as a survey, the default mode for respondents is one of 
cooperation (‘provide valid answers’). For the frame of SD to become activated 
1 Here it is important to note that when we refer to ‘Esser’s standpoint’, we are referring 
to the argument laid out in 1990. At various points, Esser has presented both perspec-
tives: making the argument for social desirability as a utility-maximizing behaviour 
(1986; 1991b) as well as a spontaneous norm-conforming behaviour (1990).
2 Stocké published a very similar article in English in 2007 that covers the same theoreti-
cal ground. 
3 ‘Low-cost’ describes situations with low direct costs, low absolute opportunity costs 
and a low utility differential (see Mayerl 2010 for a more detailed overview). 
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and override the cooperative survey frame, the normative expectations of the situ-
ation must be transparent. This means the respondent must be able to recognize 
the existence of a social norm and determine which response option best fulfils the 
expectation (see also Wolter 2012). This transparency is based on the so-called trait 
desirability (TD) of the item. Trait desirability describes the overall strength and 
direction of the desirability of the question’s content. It can be operationalized in 
various ways and summarizes the individual-level desirability beliefs (e.g.: “I think 
smoking is an undesirable habit”, “Having had many sex partners is desirable”, 
“Is it desirable or undesirable to say negative things about refugees?”). Esser’s 
conception of SD suggests an interaction between TD and the respondent’s NSA. 
TD informs the respondent about the normative expectations of the situation, the 
salience of which is increased by the respondent’s NSA. 
Esser’s outline of SD thus hinges on the respondent choosing the frame of 
SD (Fsd) out of the set of other possible frames ( { }{ 1, ,F sd NS F F F= ∈  for all 
,j N j sd∈ ≠ ), of which the assumed default frame of cooperation, Fc (lower case 
‘c’), is part of j. This means the match of the frame of SD (msd) must be greater than 
the match of any other frame: 
,sd jm m> , (1)
where, for him, sdm TD NSA= × . This conception of a match corresponds to the 
idea that there must be situational objects present relevant to the frame (TD) and 
that the respondent must connect these objects to the frame (NSA, see Kroneberg 
2006). Furthermore, if the automatic mode is activated, that is, the match is strong 
enough to at least equal the effort relative the subjective expected utility of the rc-
mode, then the respondent will act automatically based on the activated frame of 
SD:4 
( ) ( )SEU as SEU rc≥
4 We use Kroneberg’s (2005; 2006) formalization for the sake of simplicity for much of 
this paper although there are other variants (e.g. Esser (2001; 2003) and Mayerl (2009). 
For low-cost situations like the vast majority of surveys, all three of these variants 
come to the same conclusion that a perfect match (m = 1) will always block the rc-
mode (see Mayerl (2009) for an in-depth discussion on this topic). In high-cost sit-
uations, the versions of Esser and Kroneberg differ from Mayerl’s: his MFSE (with 
‘exit option’) states that, especially when the costs of choosing wrongly are high, a 
person may deliberate before acting even if the match is perfect. This can be shown 
by his formalization of the conditions necessary for the switch from as- to rc-mode 
( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )   rc i i w intrinsic motivation i iSEU rc SEU as U C m U C U p m U > → − − − + >  , compare 
with Inequality (4) below). This means that the theory as outlined in this paper as well 
as the empirical findings applies to typical survey situations but may not be applicable 
for surveys dealing with extremely sensitive topics that present more high-cost situa-
tions (e.g. illegal behaviour or infidelity).
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which derives (2)
( )( )1sd rc wm C p U C≥ − +
(Kroneberg 2005, 2006) where msd is the degree of match between the situation 
and the frame of SD, C represents the costs associated with a deliberate choice (i.e. 
effort), p is the opportunity for reflection and Urc + Cw summarizes the motivation; 
with Urc as the utility of a deliberate choice and Cw the consequences of choosing 
wrongly (Fazio 1990a; Kroneberg 2005). This is at least the case in low-cost situa-
tions (e.g. surveys) where a sufficient match of a frame can directly influence action, 
thereby skipping the script- and action-selection phase (Esser 1990; Kroneberg 
2005; 2006; Mayerl 2009).5 Even if we cannot operationalize the right-hand side 
of Inequality (2), we can make the ceteris paribus assumption that the clearer the 
norm (TD) and the higher the salience (NSA), resulting in a high match of frame 
and situation, the more likely an automatic SD response. 
SD as a Deliberate Response Behaviour 
Stocké (2004; 2007) describes the opposite standpoint. He sees SD as a deliber-
ate utility-maximizing action. While Esser assumes the cooperative frame (Fc) per 
default, Stocké expands on this assumption and states that the extent to which the 
respondent cooperates with the goals of the researcher is determined by the (strength 
of their) attitude towards surveys. The more positive and cognitively accessible 
their attitude towards surveys, the more likely they cooperate. Respondents stray 
from their cooperative role when the subjective utility of a SD response crosses 
a certain threshold. Specifically, the subjective expected utility (SEU) increases 
based on the presence of three components: 1) the respondent’s approval motive 
[ ]( ) )0,1 , 2SDU ∈  clear desirability beliefs [ ]( )1, 1TDw∆ ∈ − +  and 3) an absence of 
privacy ( [ ]0,1pw ∈ , Stocké 2004; 2007): 
( ) SD TD pSEU SD U w w= × ∆ × , (3)
Being a multiplicative equation, each of these components must be given in order to 
expect an SD response and turn the respondent from a cooperator to a ‘conformer’. 
5 When, for example, the frame clearly defines both the script and action: 1ja = , | 1j ia =  
and | 1k ja = , where |j ia  is the accessibility of script j given frame i, aj is the availability 
of script j and |k ja  is the degree to which script j regulates action k. In such case, the 
activation weight of action k ( )( | )k jAW A S  is governed solely by the match of the 
frame i: mi; see Esser 1990; Kroneberg 2006.
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Although not explicitly stated by Stocké, his argumentation seems to represent 
a truncated and somewhat altered version of the typical decision-theoretic specifi-
cation of the conditions for the switch from an as- to an rc-mode:
( ) ( )SEU rc SEU as>
which derives (4)
( )( )1 c rc wp m U C C− + > ,
(Kroneberg 2005; 2006; Kroneberg et al. 2010) where ( )1 cm−  is the degree of 
mismatch between the situation and the default frame (in this case of cooperation).
We can assume that, for most respondents, the opportunity for reflection (p, 
i.e. ability) is given and thus equals one. If we can accept that SD TD pU w w× ∆ ×  
represents the respondent’s motivation to give an SD response,6 we can state that 
the respondent may switch to a deliberate mode and consider the option of giving 
an SD answer if he or she identifies an alternative frame and has the motivation to 
do so:
( )( )1 c SD TD pm U w w C− × ∆ × > . (5)
Inequality (5) is our own interpretation of Stocké’s (2004; 2007) argument brought 
together with the more general decision-theoretic specification of Kroneberg (2005; 
2006; Kroneberg et al. 2010). While it is typically difficult to operationalize the 
degree of mismatch (1 cm− ), we can state that, ceteris paribus, the likelihood of a 
deliberate SD response increases with motivation (the second bracketed parameter 
in Inequality (5)).
Stocké’s (2004; 2007) assertion that privacy concerns are necessary to expect 
an SD response is problematic for several reasons. For one, findings on the effect of 
anonymity of SD bias are mixed. There is a great deal of empirical research find-
ing anonymity has little or no effect on SD (e.g. Börger 2013; Dwight & Feigelson 
2000; Hancock & Flowers 2001; Krysan 1998; Northover et al. 2017; Richman et 
6 It is not entirely clear, based on Stocké’s (2004, 2007) argumentation, how the approval 
motive, trait desirability and privacy concerns should translate into the more general 
MFS framework. We could speculate that the respondent’s approval motive multiplied 
by the desirability beliefs concerning a survey item could represent the utility of a de-
liberate choice ( )SD TD rcU w U× ∆ = , and that privacy concerns represent the costs of a 
wrong choice ( )p ww C= . This would change Stocké’s assertion that a lack of privacy 
concerns should negate entirely the utility of an SD response (making the contribution 
of wp additive rather than multiplicative) and brings it more in line with our belief that 
privacy concerns can increase the motivation to answer in an SD way, but are not nec-
essary.
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al. 1999; Weisband & Kiesler 1996).7 From a theoretical standpoint, it can also 
be argued that intrinsic motivations can lead respondents to provide SD answers 
even in anonymous conditions. Wolter (2012), for example, points to the concept of 
cognitive dissonance which was introduced by Festinger (1957). Cognitive disso-
nance describes discomfort that results when conflicting attitudes exist at the same 
time or when one’s attitude and behaviour does not match (Wolter 2012, p. 166). 
For example, cognitive dissonance could result when a pre-service teacher believes 
strongly that good teachers are funny, but realizes that they themselves are not 
funny. One way to deal with cognitive dissonance and relieve the feeling of discom-
fort (especially when other options – such as changing one’s behaviour – are out of 
the question) is to trivialize or ignore the existence of dissonant attitudes, beliefs or 
behaviours. Thus, we can assume that non-conformity to social norms can create 
cognitive dissonance in respondents, and that this can occur even in anonymous 
conditions. In fact, as Wolter (2012) points out, it may be more accurate to say that 
intrinsically motivated desirable responses are the result of the frame of ‘neutral-
izing cognitive dissonance’ that is functionally equivalent to the frame of ‘social 
desirability’ as outlined above. Also, as early as 1986, Esser described this type of 
intrinsically motivated SD as ‘cultural’ and the more traditional type outlined by 
Stocké (2004; 2007) as ‘situational’ SD. 
For these reasons, we expect SD responses to be the result of the respondent’s 
need for social approval and their desirability beliefs – or, indirectly, the trait desir-
ability of the item. A lack of anonymity, whether perceived or real, may increase 
the likelihood of a ‘situationally’ motivated SD response, but we do not expect that 
it is necessary. Rather, in accordance with the cognitive dissonance argument, the 
mere fact that the respondent realizes their behaviour or characteristics do not live 
up to either their own beliefs or attitudes, or the predominant views of society in 
general, should be enough to generate SD bias. The question remains whether the 
determinants of SD bias encourage an automatic norm-conforming- or a deliberate 
approval-maximizing response. This will be the focus of the next section. 
Desirable vs. Undesirable Traits
The arguments for SD bias as an automatic and as a deliberate action both point to 
the same main determinants: the respondent’s need for social approval and the trait 
desirability of the item. The argument for SD as an automatic action states that the 
presence of both determinants increases the likelihood that the frame of SD can be 
matched to the situation, leading to quick SD responses. The argument for SD as 
7 Although there are also examples of studies finding an effect (e.g. Bader et al. 2016; 
Booth-Kewley et al. 2007; Dodou & de Winter 2014; Joinson 1999; Kays et al. 2012; 
Kreuter et al. 2008; Krysan et al. 1994). 
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a deliberate action states that these same determinants increase the motivation to 
consider the option of providing an untruthful answer. This should lead to slower 
SD responses. 
It is unlikely that the respondent’s NSA on its own should govern the mode of 
responding. It does not seem plausible, for example, to assume that a respondent 
with a strong NSA will always answer faster or slower than a respondent with less 
of the characteristic. Rather, SD hinges on the transparency of the existence of 
normative expectations; i.e. the desirability beliefs of the respondents vis-à-vis the 
particular item content. NSA can be seen as heightening the salience of these sub-
jective social norms (Esser 1990). 
Thus, it would seem the mode selection, automatic or deliberate, is dependent 
primarily on the item content. If we imagine a graph with an item’s TD on the 
x-axis ranging from very undesirable to very desirable (with neither undesirable 
nor desirable in the middle of the scale) and the response latencies on the y-axis, 
the automatic argument would suggest an inverted U-shape: the clearer the social 
norms are (increasing desirability and undesirability), the faster the responses 
should be. On that same graph, the deliberate argument would suggest the opposite: 
a U-shaped curve with responses becoming slower the clearer the social norms. 
The top two panels of Figure 1 summarize these theoretical expectations. 
Results of a Previous Study 
In a previous study, we examined the relationship between item- and respondent-
related characteristics and response latencies (Andersen & Mayerl 2017). Whereas 
response latencies are the independent variable in this study, then they were the 
dependent variable. The aim of the study was to take a preliminary look at how 
the determinants of SD (particularly TD and NSA) affected the length of time 
the respondents took to answer the questions. In terms of TD, we did not find the 
expected U- or inverted U-shaped curve as outlined above, as the squared TD term 
had no significant effect. Rather, the main effect of TD was negative and significant. 
The bottom panel of Figure 1 shows the empirical results contrasted with the theo-
retical expectations outlined above. 
On a bipolar scale, the negative effect means that response latencies become 
faster the more desirable the item content is. On the other hand, the more undesir-
able the item content, the slower the responses become. This effect remains when 
controlling for factors such as the respondent’s baseline speed, the length of the 
question, its position in the questionnaire, etc. The effect is furthermore linear in 
nature; on a scale from -4 to +4, latencies become increasingly slower as the item 
content becomes more undesirable (meaning it does not seem to be merely a result 
of negative keying). 
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diagrams is arbitrary; see Andersen & Mayerl 2017
Figure 1 Hypothesized and observed relationship between trait desirability and 
response latency
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We took this as evidence to suggest that not only the transparency of the 
social norm surrounding a survey item but also its direction is important for deter-
mining the mode of responding. Undesirable item content seems to trigger more 
deliberate responses while desirable item content seems to lead to more automatic 
ones. In fact, some research has dealt with the possibility that certain respondents 
react more strongly to desirable content and others to undesirable content. Paul-
hus has even suggested a four-factor typology of SD responding that differenti-
ates between the degree of awareness (impression management vs. self-deception) 
as well as the content (Paulhus 2002). Along the content dimension, respondents 
are grouped according to their motivation for answering untruthfully. Respondents 
that are motivated by egoistic factors attempt to present themselves in an overly 
positive light, highlighting their social and intellectual traits such as dominance, 
fearlessness, emotional stability, intellect and creativity (Paulhus 2002, p. 63 f.). 
Respondents that are motivated by moralistic factors tend to deny socially-deviant 
characteristics and claim such social qualities as agreeableness, dutifulness and 
restraint (Paulhus 2002, p. 64). Uziel (2010) refers to a similar typology and uses 
labels previously coined in earlier work by Paulhus & Reid (1991): adjustment and 
defensiveness.8 Defensiveness is characterized by the “avoidance of threatening 
situations” (Uziel 2010, p. 247), and that defensive respondents are motivated not 
by “social approval, but rather the avoidance of social disapproval” (Uziel 2010, p. 
247). Adjustment describes respondents that tend to use the survey situation as a 
way to exaggerate positive characteristics like friendliness, stability and well-being 
(Uziel 2010, p. 248). 
While research on the topic of a possible four-factor model of social desir-
ability (impression management vs. self-deception and egoistic vs. moralistic) has 
not fully matured for various reasons,9 we believe this line of reasoning may be 
promising in explaining why response latencies seem to react differently based on 
the content of the question. Without the possibility of operationalizing a fully dif-
ferentiated NSA scale, our preliminary work nevertheless leads us to believe that 
not only the strength but also the direction of the TD should be of importance. 
8 There are other terms used to describe this difference, Damarin & Messick (1965), 
refer to ‘propagandistic’ and ‘autistic’ motives, for example. 
9 Personality-scales meant to assess those with a tendency towards a self-deceptive 
moralistic bias, or ‘self-deceptive denial’ have not been popularly implemented due to 
ethical concerns and factor analytic empirical evidence suggesting it is rather weakly 
pronounced (Paulhus & Reid 1991). 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This study is interested in examining two main questions. First, is SD the result 
of an automatic or a deliberate process? We examine this question by specifying a 
three-way interaction between the determinants of SD (trait desirability and need 
for social approval) and the response latencies, and observing the self-reported 
scores given by the respondents. If SD is an automatic behaviour as outlined by 
Esser (1990), then we should observe more biased scores when the match is suffi-
cient ( sdm TD NSA= × ) and the respondent answers quickly. If SD is a deliberate 
behaviour as argued by Stocké (2004, 2007), then scores should be more biased 
when the motivation is sufficient (U TD NSA= × ) and the respondent answers 
slowly. Again, the inconsistency of the views of Esser and Stocké should be clear: 
how can the interaction between TD and NSA at once represent the match and the 
motivation? However, by looking at the three-way interaction TD NSA RL× ×  and 
observing how respondents answered, we aim to identify which conceptualization 
is more plausible. It is entirely possible that any and all components of the interac-
tion could fail to show significant effects on the scores of the respondents. It could 
be that the interaction TD NSA×  affects scores but that speed at which the respon-
dent answers plays no role, for example. We therefore proceed in a step-wise fash-
ion, first looking at the main effects individually, then the two-way effects before 
finally moving on the suggested three-way interaction. 
With our second research question we hope to contribute to finding a way to 
bridge the gap between the competing conceptualizations. It seems likely, based on 
an abundance of empirical evidence, that SD can be both an automatic as well as 
a deliberate behaviour. But what are the mechanisms responsible for determining 
the mode? Obviously, we cannot state that TD NSA×  at once causes automatic and 
deliberate SD responses. However, based on the four-factor SD typology put forth 
by Damarin & Messick (1965), Paulhus & Reid (1991), Paulhus (2002), and Uziel 
(2010) and our observations from previous research, we have reason to believe that 
the direction of the TD, whether desirable or undesirable, may be an often-over-
looked factor that influences how SD manifests. 
We integrate the theoretical and empirical knowledge and formulate the fol-
lowing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: highly desirable item content and a strong need for social approval 
should mean that faster responses are associated with more positive scores.  
Hypothesis 2: highly undesirable item content and a strong need for social approval 
should mean that slower responses are associated with more positive scores. 
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Data and Method 
Data 
The study uses data from a research project carried out at the Technische Uni-
versität Kaiseralutern called EVA3PLUS. The project is a longitudinal panel-study 
with computer assisted self-interview (CASI) tablet questionnaires with three sur-
vey waves taking place at intervals of around six months. The project attempted to 
conduct a complete sample of all biology and chemistry pre-service teachers at the 
Gymnasium-level (a university/college preparation-level secondary school form in 
Germany) in Rhineland-Palatinate from mid-2014 to mid-2017. In total, the over-
all sample size for the study is 631 with 416 individual respondents participating 
between one and three times. Substantively, the study looks at pre-service biology 
and chemistry teachers’ attitudes and behaviours with regards to using experiments 
in the classroom. The methodological focus of the project is on the use of response 
latencies to improve the quality of survey data. 
Variables 
The dependent variable are scores on 30 items of teacher-related characteristics, 
each measured on a 7-point rating scale (Appendix 1 shows the descriptive statis-
tics of the dependent variable and Appendix 3 reports the wording of the 30 items 
along with the mean trait desirability scores). The items asked respondents to self-
assess their qualities as a teacher. They included statements such as “Spending time 
with teenagers is a lot of fun” and “I feel insecure when I have to speak in front of 
others”. Normatively speaking, these are characteristics teachers should (or should 
not) possess: they should like spending time with teenagers and should not have 
problems speaking in front of others, for example. We assume, therefore, that they 
are principally sensitive topics for future teachers. Although the surveys were con-
ducted anonymously and without the presence of an interviewer, we assume further 
that confronting the fact that one does not possess a desirable characteristic (or 
rather that one possesses an undesirable characteristic) will lead to uncomfortable 
cognitive dissonance (“I want to be a teacher, but I am not good at being a teacher”, 
see Wolter 2012). Items suggesting undesirable characteristics were recoded so that 
higher values always indicate more desirable answers (agreeing to possessing posi-
tive characteristics and disagreeing to negative ones). 
The method for collecting the response latencies is outlined in detail in Ander-
sen & Mayerl (2017). Due to the large degree of non-normality of the distribution, 
and in order to eliminate outliers, the top and bottom 5% of the distribution was 
eliminated (see Mayerl & Urban 2008 for more on the preparation of raw RLs for 
analysis). This resulted in a mean response latency of 4.6 seconds (std. dev. = 2.0). 
methods, data, analyses | Vol. 13(1), 2019, pp. 7-3520 
The response latency variable is continuous; it does not represent a dichotomous 
pair of options but rather illustrates a continuum with a deliberative-controlled 
mode on the pole of high elaboration and the automatic-spontaneous mode at the 
other extreme end of low elaboration (see for more on this Carlston & Skowronski 
1986; Gibbons & Rammsayer 1999; Mayerl 2010; Schaffner & Roche 2016, Shep-
pard & Teale 2000; Shiv & Fedorikhin 2002). 
Desirability beliefs can be assessed by either asking the respondent them-
selves whether a characteristic is desirable or undesirable in their opinion, or by 
asking the respondent to judge how the characteristic is viewed by society in gen-
eral (Stocké 2004). In either case, the trait desirability of an item is generated by 
aggregating the individual desirability beliefs into an overall measure. In order to 
assess the trait desirability of the items, a small secondary pencil-and-paper sur-
vey of other students in biology and chemistry teachers’ education programs at the 
Technische Universität Kaiseralutern was conducted (n = 77). The sample popula-
tions of the main study and the small trait desirability supplementary study can be 
seen as very homogenous groups. The students were asked to assess how desirable 
the various teacher characteristics were seen in society in general. The scale ranged 
from -4: “extremely undesirable” to +4: “extremely desirable” with 0 as the middle 
category: “neutrally seen”. The mean scores can be found in Appendix 3. 
The respondents’ need for social approval was measuring using two items 
from the Crowne-Marlowe SD scale (Crowne & Marlowe 1960, p. 351). The index 
was created as an average of the two scores, displaying satisfactory characteristics 
(α = .65). In cases in which the respondent answered the NSA scale in two different 
waves of data collection, the NSA score was averaged over the two occasions. If the 
respondent took part more than once in the overall survey but only provided valid 
NSA scores on one occasion, those values were copied over to the other wave(s). 
We feel comfortable in doing this as NSA is typically seen as a stable personality 
trait: zi as opposed to zit to put it in terms of a typical panel analysis, see the ana-
lytical strategy section (DeMaio 1984; Krumpal 2013; Tourangeau & Yan 2007). 
The descriptive statistics of the items are found in Appendix 2. In order to better 
interpret the three-way interaction between TD, NSA and RL, for the analysis we 
collapsed the scale into a dichotomous variable with 0 = weak to moderate NSA (< 
6) and 1 = strong NSA (≥ 6). 
We include other respondent- and item-characteristics into the models as fixed 
effects: the respondent’s tendency to acquiescence (based on a count of the amount 
of times the respondent answered “completely agree” on 64 other survey items), sex 
(male = 1), year of birth, whether or not they had taken part in the survey before 
(repeat = 1) and the number of item syllables. As they are specified, the models 
allow us to include such variables and observe their effects but they are not strictly 
necessary. The use of respondent and item fixed-effects multilevel models through 
within-cluster centering allows us to control for unobserved differences between 
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respondents and items (more on that below, see Enders & Tofighi 2007; Rüttenauer 
2018). Descriptive statistics of the predictors can be found in Appendix 1.
Self- vs. Other-Assessment 
Without validation data, studies looking at SD bias are often forced to use the 
‘more (or less) is better’ assumption (Wolter 2012). Here, we take higher item scores 
as an indication of more biased responses. Obviously, this assumption is problem-
atic because it is not possible to disprove that high item scores are not just truthful 
answers by respondents that actually possess a desirable trait to a high degree. To 
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some extent, this is not particularly troubling because we include explicit SD indi-
cators as explanatory variables in the model. If high item scores are not at least 
partially the result of SD bias, then we should not expect any meaningful results 
from these predictors. 
To further put concerns to rest, we collected a secondary sample in which we 
asked the instructors at the teachers’ colleges (n = 175) to assess the study respon-
dents’ possession of the 30 characteristics. The ‘other-assessment’ questionnaires 
were sent out within a week or so of the respondents having completed the main 
survey. This other-assessment survey gives us an external criterion with which we 
can test the plausibility of the assumption that some scores are, indeed, biased by 
SD. Figure 2 summarizes the results of this secondary study. It shows the mean 
differences between the other- and the self-assessments (with 95% confidence inter-
vals). Negative values indicate the respondents’ instructor rated the person more 
poorly than the person rated themselves. We take mean values in the negative range 
as evidence that a substantial number of respondents answered in an SD fashion 
(i.e. presented themselves in a more positive light than the external criterion). 
Unfortunately, due to the relatively small sample size and further item non-
responses, it was not practical to include this information in the following statistical 
models. However, the findings give us confidence in continuing on with the analysis 
under the assumption that more positive self-assessments are at least partially the 
result of SD bias. 
Analytical Strategy 
The data is structured as follows: respondents ( 1j J= … ) and items ( 1k K= … ) are 
crossed; each respondent answers each item and each item is answered by each 
respondent (at least ideally, given no item nonresponse). We refer to measure-
ments at the lowest level ( 1 ) i N= … as ‘events’ which are nested at once within 
both respondents and items. Events cover all variables that vary within respondents 
and items, including response latencies (which we can refer to as ( )i jkx ) and our 
dependent variable, item scores ( ( )i jky ). The respondents’ need for social approval 
(NSAj) and the item’s trait desirability (TDk) vary across respondents and items, 
respectively. 
We use multilevel modeling to account for the hierarchical nature of the data 
(Hox et al. 2018). This allows us to account for the nested structure by including 
random effects for our grouping variables. Furthermore, we apply within-cluster 
centering to our level 1 predictor, response latencies. This has the effect of ensur-
ing our level 1 predictor is uncorrelated with the higher level predictors, and makes 
the corresponding regression slopes based solely on within-cluster variation (see 
Enders & Tofighi 2007 for a comprehensive overview of within-cluster centering, 
see also Allison 2009). Thus, doing so allows us to control for unobserved dif-
23 Andersen/Mayerl: Responding to Socially Desirable and Undesirable Topics
ferences between respondents and items. For this reason, such models are some-
times referred to as fixed-effects multilevel models (e.g. Rüttenauer 2018). In fact, 
for studies interested in the effect of level-1 predictors or cross-level interactions, 
Enders & Tofighi (2007) suggest always centering level-1 variables within-cluster. 
Variables at the higher level were centered around the grand mean except for the 
dummies for NSA, sex, and repeat respondents which retained their original metric. 
We began our analysis by specifying an intercept-only model (Model 0, not 
shown in Table 1) that included random intercepts for respondents and items but no 
predictors at any level. The interclass correlations (ICCs) obtained from that model 
showed that 17% ( .17jρ = ) and 4% ( .04kρ = ) of the variance in item scores (y) is 
attributable to the respondents and the items, respectively (for more on this see Hox 
et al. 2018). In a second step, we tested whether the slopes of RL on scores var-
ied systematically between respondents or items. The results showed a model that 
included by-respondent and by-item intercepts and by-item random slopes for RLs. 
We settled on this model specification based on a likelihood ratio test that showed 
significant by-item slope variation compared to one with only random intercepts 
( ( )2 1 29.566,  0.001pχ = < , see Baayen, Davidson & Bates 2008). 
In order to gain a better understanding of the contribution of the various pre-
dictors, we proceed in a step-wise fashion, first introducing the main effects of all 
predictors at the various levels (Model 1), before then introducing two-way interac-
tions between the predictors of interest (Model 2), and then finally introducing the 
three-way interaction between the determinants of SD (TD and NSA) and the RLs 
(Model 3). Doing so allows us to observe the effects in isolation before moving on 
to the interpretation of the more complicated ones. Model 1, which includes the 
main effects of all predictors at all levels can be written as
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 00 1 00 0 10
0 0 10 01 ,
 
 
ji jk i jk
k j k k i jk i jk
item score RL NSA
TD u u u RL e
γ γ γ
γ
= + + +
+…+ + + +
 (6)
where ( )0 00γ  is the overall intercept, 0 ju , 0ku  and ( )i jke  are the respondent-, item- 
and idiosyncratic deviations from the overall mean and 1ku  the by-item random 
slope parameter. ( )1 00γ , ( )0 10γ  and ( )0 01γ  are the coefficients for the variables RL, 
NSA and TD, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, the other control variables are 
not shown in the equation. The inclusion of cross-level interactions between predic-
tors at various levels follows straight-forwardly from Equation (6). 
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Table 1 Fixed-effects multilevel models, dependent variable: item scores 
(recoded)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b se b se b se
Intercept 4.306*** (.117) 4.316 *** (.124) 4.316 *** (.123)
Event-level variables
Response latency (RL) -.051 ** (.016) -.049 ** (.018) -.049 ** (.018) 
Respondent-level variables
Repeat respondent -.039 (.088) -.040 (.088) -.042 (.088) 
Need social approval (NSA) .136 (.091) .122 (.127) .127 (.127) 
Acquiescence .407 (.496) .409 (.495) .409 (.495) 
Male .125 (.100) .126 (.100) .125 (.099) 
Year of birth -.010 (.020) -.010 (.020) -.010 (.020) 
Item-level variables
Syllables -.020 * (.009) -.020 * (.009) -.020 * (.009) 
Trait desirability (TD) .112 *** (.022) .026 (.040) .104 * (.048) 
Cross-level interactions
TD x NSA -.014 (.017) -.150 ** (.050) 
TD x RL -.022 ** (.007) -.005 (.009) 
NSA x RL -.003 (.019) -.002 (.019) 
TD x NSA x RL -.029 ** (.010) 
Goodness of fit
AIC 23,377.5 23,374.8 23,368.3
BIC 23,472.8 23,490.6 23,490.9
Log-Likelihood -11,674.7 -11,670.4 -11,666.2
Observations
Total 6,693 6,693 6,693
Groups 
Respondent 244 244 244
Item 30 30 30
Variance components
Respondent .381 .380 .379
Item .121 .087 .086
Item .005 .003 .003
Residual  1.765 1.765 1.763
Note. Estimator: REML, for goodness of fit statistics model was re-ran with ML; event-
level predictor RL was centered within-cluster, higher level variables centered around 
grand mean; unstandardized estimates; models estimated using lme4 package in R 
(Bates et al. 2015); ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10; two-sided test
( )2 intjσ −
( )2 intkσ −
( )2k slopeσ −
( )2eσ
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Analysis
The results of the analysis can be found in Table 1. It shows the unstandardized 
coefficients (b) and standard errors (se). As for Model 1, which includes only the 
main effects of the predictors at all levels, we see that the TD of the item has a sig-
nificant positive effect on scores (b = .112, p < .001), meaning the more desirable 
the trait, the more respondents tended to claim to possess it. Here it is important 
to note that while scores were recoded so that higher values always indicated more 
desirable responses, TD was measured on a bipolar scale (from -4 to +4 before 
centering).10 This means that undesirable and desirable items were not treated 
equally by respondents. Desirable traits lead disproportionately to more positive 
answers than undesirable traits lead to less negative ones. Finally, we observe a sig-
nificant negative effect of RLs (b = -.051, p < .01). The longer the respondent took 
to answer the question, the more negatively the respondents rated their qualities as 
a teacher. Looking just at the isolated effect of RLs on scores, however, does not tell 
us anything about SD responses. In order to better understand the extent to which 
RLs relate to SD, we must look at them in combination with the determinants of 
SD. This is shown in Model 2. 
Model 2 introduces all two-way interactions that are implied by the three-way 
interaction in Model 3. Here, we see that the interaction between the TD and RL 
is significant (b = -.022, p < .01). Figure 3 shows the interaction graphically. The 
result suggests that only fast responses seem to be influenced by the desirability 
of the item content. This is evidenced by the intercepts, the ranking of which cor-
responds to the TD value. Amongst fast responses, the difference in scores between 
very desirable (solid line, +2) and very undesirable (lower dotted line, -4) items is 
fairly substantial, roughly one and a half scale-points. On the other hand, there is 
almost no difference in scores for slow responses based on TD. As mentioned ear-
lier in reference to the previous study, here too the effect of TD does not seem to 
be simply due to the item keying. If it was, the regression lines would not fan out. 
If this was the case, the slopes for the items of above-average desirability would 
overlap; the same would go for the undesirable side. Also, as with the effect of TD 
in Model 1, scores are disproportionately affected by desirable item content. In fact, 
the regression slope for the most undesirable content (lower dotted line) is slightly 
positive, meaning respondents answering more slowly to these items rated their 
teaching characteristics more positively. However, it is difficult to interpret this as 
an ‘editing’ process (Tourangeau & Yan 2007) as the slowest of responses are not 
nearly as positive as the fast responses for desirable items. 
10 Also, for the sake of simplicity, we will often refer to ‘desirable’ vs. ‘undesirable’ traits 
– however, due to the centering of the variables, we are actually comparing items of 
‘above average desirability’ with those of ‘below average desirability’.
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In model 2, the main effect of TD falls out of significance. As is the case in all 
models, the effect of the number of syllables is significant (the effect stays constant 
throughout at b = -.020, p < .05). The longer the question, the more negatively the 
respondents rated their teaching qualities. On the other hand, the interactions of 
NSA with TD and RL are not significant. This means that the speed of responses 
does not moderate the effect of NSA on scores and that the central implied interac-
tion TD NSA×  does not systematically influence scores. 
Although Model 2 shows the central interaction  is not significant, we never-
theless test the three-way interaction TD NSA RL× ×  in Model 3. This interaction 
is in fact significant (b = -.029, p < .01) and can be inspected graphically in Figure 
4. Whereas Figure 3 suggests that only fast responses are affected by TD, Figure 4 
shows us that this is not exactly the case. To illustrate this, we start by describing 
the right side of Figure 4 which shows the results for respondents with a weak to 
moderate NSA. Here, we see that TD has an effect on scores as evidenced by the 
spread of the intercepts. The more desirable the trait, the more respondents claimed 
to possess it (and vice versa). Curiously, for respondents with a weak NSA, longer 
responses are actually associated with more negative self-assessments. 
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Figure 3 Two-way interaction: trait desirability x response latency (Model 2) 
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Now, if we compare this to the left side of Figure 4, the relevance of the result 
to the theoretical discussion above becomes clearer. As with Figure 3, we see a 
fairly pronounced effect of TD on scores for fast responses (see intercepts). How-
ever, the slopes for the extreme TD values (solid line and dotted line) are steeper 
amongst those with a strong NSA. For the most desirable traits, faster responses are 
substantially more positive than slower ones. For undesirable traits, it is the slower 
responses that are more positive. To summarize, we can state that the answers of 
respondents with a low to moderate NSA are influenced by the TD of the item, and 
that their answers are more consistent regardless of how long they take to answer 
the question. In fact, if anything they actually tend to become more reserved the 
longer they take to answer. For respondents with a strong NSA, the negative effect 
of desirable traits and the positive effect of undesirable ones are almost equally 
strong. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The findings generally lend support to our hypotheses. If we can accept response 
latencies as an appropriate proxy for the degree of elaboration (with automatic and 
deliberate modes at each end of the spectrum), then social desirability seems to be 
the result of both automatic and deliberate actions. The mode of response seems to 
be in part dependent on the desirability or undesirability of the item content. 
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Figure 4 Three-way interaction: trait desirability x need for social approval x 
response latency (Model 3)
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We take the results to indicate that respondents that answer quickly to desir-
able traits may be answering in a SD way, irrespective of their NSA. For undesir-
able traits, the longer the response, the more positive the self-reports become in 
the case of strong NSA. Thus, NSA seems have a strong moderating effect on the 
interaction between RL and TD. Taken together, we are left with the conclusion that 
both scenarios (automatic and deliberate) are as plausible now as when we started 
out. Our results suggest a strong need for social approval and a very desirable trait 
leads to more automatic SD answers as outlined by Esser’s argument. On the other 
hand, Stocké’s assertion that trait desirability and need for social approval lead 
to deliberate SD answers is supported if one looks only at the very undesirable 
traits. We suggest, therefore, that the content of the item may be an important factor 
that determines the mode of response. This has not been discussed by either Esser 
(1990, 1991a, 1991b) or Stocké (2004, 2007), but could be an overlooked factor 
that allows both views to exist simultaneously. In general, our results suggest it is 
unlikely that socially desirable responses are either simply fast or slow. However, at 
this point, the exact mechanism responsible for this observed relation can only be 
speculated on. More work is needed to investigate the interplay in greater detail and 
assess the generalizability of the results.
In fact, it could be that the results of this study are specific to our research/sur-
vey design: tablet-based CASI surveys of a relatively homogenous sample regard-
ing a very specific, relatively low-cost topic. Other types of surveys (web-based, 
CATI, CAPI), samples and topics could yield different results. Also, the analytical 
framework does not make it possible to truly test whether, for example, trait desir-
ability leads to fast/slow responses which has been taken for granted throughout 
this article. It is possible that the causal direction is actually the opposite: perhaps 
respondents that take their time with the survey tend to be more receptive to the TD 
of the item. Furthermore, our expectations in this study were strongly influenced 
by what we empirically observed in a previous study. While there is some research 
that supports the overall sentiment that respondents may react differently based on 
certain types of questions, we are still very much in the beginning stages of flesh-
ing out our theoretical argument. More work is needed that brings together not only 
the psychological work on egoistic/moralistic bias but also the methods such as 
response latencies to measure cognitive processing modes. 
We ultimately encourage a more systematic investigation and manipulation of 
the various components. Indeed, socially desirable responses seem dependent on a 
complex interplay between respondent-, item-, and survey-characteristics. We hope 
with this article to draw attention to this and contribute to a better understanding 
of the use of response latencies to identify and hopefully correct measurement bias 
due to social desirability. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 Descriptive Statistics
mean sd min max n missing
Event-level variables
Item scores 4.60 1.54 1.00 7.00 9720 0
Response latency 4.65 2.00 1.88 11.86 8769 951
Respondent-level variables
Repeat respondent .39 .49 .00 1.00 9720 0
Need for social approval 5.78 .83 3.00 7.00 7306 2414
Acquiescence .11 .10 .00 .63 9660 60
Sex (male) .29 .45 0.00 1.00 9660 60
Year of birth 1987.42 2.49 1979.00 1991.00 9660 60
Item-level variables
Syllables 17.26 4.72 7.00 29.00 9720 0
Trait desirability .75 1.92 -2.77 2.83 9720 0
Note. Original metrics before centering; constant of 1,900 subtracted from Year of birth
Appendix 2 Descriptive Statistics of Need for Social 
Approval Items 
mean sd min max n missing reliability
No matter who I’m talking to,  
I’m always a good listener. 5.75 0.95 2.00 7.00 242 389
.65I am always courteous, even to  
people who are disagreeable. 5.83 1.08 2.00 7.00 242 389
Note. Cronbach’s Alpha reliability; statistics based on the untransformed wide-format data 
(one row per respondent) rather than the long-format data used for the rest of the analysis 
(with one row per ‘event’); 1: does not apply to me at all … 7: applies fully and com-
pletely to me
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Appendix 3 Mean Trait Desirability Score Per Item and 
Standard Deviation (sd)
Item mean sd
Interaction with younger people (Teenagers)
1 Spending time with teenagers is a lot of fun. 2.82 1.10
2 [-] Teenagers tend to annoy me quickly. -2.77 1.40
3 I always get along with teenagers. 2.38 1.35
Humour
4 I find it easy to make others laugh. 1.29 1.57
5 My friends and acquaintances appreciate my friendly disposition. 1.74 1.59
6 [-] I sometimes have trouble being funny at the right moment. -.81 1.40
Tolerance for frustration (Frustration)
7 I take being insulted well. 1.64 1.67
8 [-] I am very sensitive to personal accusations and attacks. -2.01 1.50
9 I can cope with disappointment better than many other people. .74 1.82
Ability to assert oneself (Conflict)
10 I am able to stick by my opinions in conflicts. 1.73 1.42
11 [-] When I am challenged I sometimes find it difficult to argue my point 
convincingly. -1.70 1.73
12 I am good at winning arguments. 1.69 1.41
Flexibility
13 I deal well with unforeseen situations. 2.08 1.49
14 [-] I need things to go as planned. -.91 1.61
15 I can adapt myself to new situations without any problems. 1.90 1.18
Social sensibility (Empathy)
16 [-] I find it difficult to put myself in someone else’s shoes. -2.32 1.82
17 I have good feeling for how to deal with people. 2.55 1.32
18 I am aware of problems other people may be having. 2.22 1.12
Didactic abilities (Didactics)
19 I am good at explaining complex situations. 2.82 1.33
20 [-] Sometimes I am not able to communicate complex topics so that other 
people are able to understand. -1.91 2.09
21 I find it easy to teach others. 2.83 1.31
Comfort speaking in front of others (Manner)
22 I don’t mind talking in front of a group unprepared. 1.60 2.02
23 When I have to speak or present in front of a group, I am able to over-
come my nervousness. 2.17 1.27
24 [-] I feel insecure when I have to speak in front of others. -2.45 1.47
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Item mean sd
Ability to express oneself (Expression)
25 [-] My ability to express myself in discussions is sometimes limited. -1.66 1.77
26 I am able to express complicated things clearly and concisely. 2.09 1.36
27 I can adjust the way I express myself depending on who I am talking to. 1.94 1.30
Ability to awake interest (Enthusiasm)
28 I am good at getting people excited about things. 2.45 1.29
29 [-] I find it difficult to convince others of things. -1.94 1.50
30 I am good at getting people interested in things. 2.34 1.40
Note. [-] denotes undesirable item content; -4: strongly undesirable… 0: neutrally seen… 
+4: strongly desirable
